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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
ALTON

R.

MA'l"ERS,

Petitioner ,a;nd Relator,
vs.
M. J. BRoNsox, -one of the Judges
of the Third Judiciat District
Court of the State of Utah, and
the Third Judicial District
·Court of the !State .of Utah in
and for ·Salt La:ke ~County,

Case No. 6252

Defendamts.

REPLY TO BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

Counsel for defendants have argued that prohibition
is not the proper remedy in the instant case. The argument is predicated upon the assumption that the order
of the lower eourt against which relief is sought is a
final order from whic.h an appeal ma.y be taken. If that
assumption is found to be not justified then counsels'
entire .argument falls to the ground.
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The orde,r in the instant'. ~case 1s .not a final order
fr.om 'vhich an _a:p:peai will lie. On. the contrary it is
a.~ alte.rnative, .conditional and .anti,cipatory order. It
could -only be ·made final and app:ealalbie .after petitioner
had suffered irreparable injury hy suhmitting to an inspection by the tax c.onmri.ssio.n of his books, ree;ords and
files and by presenting himself for examination relating
t.o matters concerning which the'ta.x commission has no
authority to m'ak~ s.uch inspecti~on or to conduct such examination, or, in the alternative, ~by refusing to make
such ·submission and to testify and then submitting to
the humiliation .of being declared to he in contempt of
cou!t and .being se:ntenced to a term in pris·on.
I

•-

'

'

'-

I.
ORDER COMPLAINED OF NOT FINAL OR APPEALABLE.

·The order o.f the district court against ·which these
proceedings are dir~cted is as follows:
"In accordance with the Findings of Fact
and C:onclusions of. L~aw 1nade and entered this
29'th day of Ma.rc!h, A. D. 1940:

'''IT Is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED .that Alton R. Mlayers he .and he is hereby
· f.ound g1lilty of cont~empt under Section 104-45-15,
Revise-d Statutes of Utah, 1933, ,a:nd it is further
or.dered that said Alt·on R. Mayers may purge
himself of said contempt by appearing before the
1State Tax c·ommission on M.6nday, the 8th day of
Ap.ril, A.· D., ·1940, at .tbe hour of 10:00 o'·clock
A. M., and there to testify and produce the books,
records,· docum·ents, etc., called for by the subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

poena of the State Tax Commission heretofore
issued and heretofore duly s.e_rv'ed upon said.; ~\1ton R.. Mayers; that, in the _event s·aid Alton R.
Mayers does not so purg-e hin1s.e'l.f of s.aid .contempt, he appear hef·ore this Court on Monday,
the 8th day of April, A. D.,. 1940, at the hour of
10:00 o'clock A. M. f.or sentence.''
In this state, 104-41-1, R.evised Statutes, of Utah,
193'3, an appeal lies only from fin.al j'udgments of the dis-

trict court. The above order is not a· finar· order.
conditional and alternative.

It is

L ·-··

The general rule with respect to· conditional or alternative judgments, orders or decre·es· ·is well. 'stated under
the subject of Appeal and Error in 3 C. J. 556-7, Section
396:

* * But an order adjudging a contempt, and prescribing a pui,lishment conditi.ona.l
upon the action of the party in contempt, is not
a final ·order, and is therefore not .app·ealalble. ·Nor
will an appea'llie from an order adjudging a party
in contempt, but reS'erving the question of punishme:nt f.or further consideration, from an order
requiring one to sho\v c.ause why he should not
be punished for contempt in £a,iling to appear as
a. witness, or from a mere initiatory order dire0ting an attachment to issue for the purpose of
. bringing the party before th·e court to answer interrogatories. * * *"
"·~

The general rule announced. a bove finds exemplifica1

tion in the case of Semrow v. Semrow, 26 Minn. 9, 46
N. W. Rep. 446 (1897).

The facts in th.a.t case and the
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court's ruling thereon are set forth in the following two
eXJcerp·ts from the .court's opinion :
''The order, which is the subje-ct of this appeal, was granted upon an order to show cause
why defendant ought not to be punished, a.s for
a cont·empt of .court, for refusing obedience to a
previous order made in the aetion, requiring hin1
to pay to plaintiff a certain .sum therein named as
temp·orary alimony. In substance and effect, it
adjudges him guilty of the contempt charged, and
furth·er directs, as punishment therefor, that a
warrant shall be issued for his arrest and c:ommit:ment for the time mentioned therein, unless
he pays the amount of suCJh. alimony awarded,
with interest from the date of the order gr1anting
it, with $10 costs o.f m.otion, within 10 days after
personal service upon him o.f the last-.granted
order. In other words the order adjudges him in
contempt, prescrilbes the terms upon which, and
the time within which, he may purge himself of
the contempt, and orders the prescribed punishment in case he fails to comply with the c-onditions within the required time.

·

·''Whether this is an .appealable order is the
first question for consi.deration. If an appeal lies
at all, it must be under the first clause of the
sixth subdivision of Gen. rS.t. c. 86, Se~c. 8, which
allows an appeal 'from a final order affecting a
su~bstantial right, made in a special proceeding.'
·The .order in question i.s not one of that character.
It is not .a final order in the ma.t·ter. It is a preliminary and conditional ·one, dire:cting the punishment of the party d·efendant in case he re.fuses
to comply with its requirements. No warrant ean
be issued or arrest ·made under it. Before any
punishment can be inflicted up·on him, proof must
be made to the court that he has refused to com-

1
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ply "~ith its conditions, and a final and absolute
order made thereon, directing it. It· nray be that,
upon the application for that order, faets may be
sho,vn upon which the court below 'vill feel eompelled, in the exercise of its discretion, to "\Yithhold it .altogether. The present is not, therefore,
·an absolute and final order affecting any substantial right of th·e party, and is not appealable.
Brinkley v. Brinkley, 47 N. Y. 40. App·e~l dismissed.''
What is said in the a·bove ca.se concerning the eonditional and preliminary nature of the order there under
consideration could be said with equal appliea!bility in
the instant case.

In Brinkey v. Brinkley, 47 N. Y. Rep. 40 (1871), a
similar order was under consideration, concerning which
the court said at pag·e 46:

''It will be noticed, upon a reading of the
order, that it does not, as to a part of the specified punishment, .absolutely impose it upon the
defendant. It is an order, in the first part of it,
that unless within ten days he complies with the
order which he had refused to obey, and pay ten
dollars cost, his ansrwer .should be stricken out,
and the .cause s:hould proceed as if there were no
.answer, and that it be referred t.o a referee named
t.o take proofs. The order, s·o far, is C!onditional.
The punishment is not inflicted absolutely, but it
is in his power to a vert it; and if he doe.s not a vail
himself of the condition, there must 'be proof put
·on file of his failure so to do, and another order
of the court making peremptory and .absolute that
which, by tthis o-rder is but condi tiona I. * * * ' '
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In Cherry. v. Cherry, ·253- ·Ma:.ss~ 17'2, 148 · N., E. 570
~ 1925·);_ pro:c·eed.ing·~. ·:were commenced

in.· M'assachusetts

t?

enjoin the defendftnt from :prosecuting: a divorce action in Nevada. · F'or failure to obey an order of the
c-ourt e~1joining further prosecutio_n of the divorc.e action,
defendant. w:i's ordered placed in the cust;ody of the
sheriff, but the case· was eontinued for sentence for two
'veek:s, during which '-time the defendant was directed to
dismiss the Nevada proc-eeding. If he failed to do so
he was to be committed to the custody of the sheriff
until co-mpliance was made. Defendant did not appear
for sentence and his sureties were defaulted. A w·rit of
er-ror w·as sued out ·but the court dis-missed it ·on. t1he
ground tha1t defevn,darnt had no-t been. sentenced and there
:was no foncil judgmevn.t.
In Boorii>s v. Log·an, (M.ass.) 1~64 N. E. 921 {1929),
a'..decree was entered· of this tenor : ''This cas-e came on
to he- h.eard upon merits, having been argu·ed by couns~l, and .thereu:pq~,~·· upon consideration thereof, it is
ordered, adjudged a1_1d decreed upon return to the pJ,ain_tiff {)f the sum of oll.e thousand dollars ($1,000) paid as
depos{t the bill he dismissed.'' C'oncerning this decree,
the appellate eourt s·aid :
1

.

'

'

"This \vas not a final decree either in .form
or .substance. It did not unequivO'cally or-der that
the· bill he. dismissed, but· made such dismissal
conditiona~ upon the return of a specified sum
of money to the p·Laintiff. It did not order- the
_payment of that sum to -the plaintiff by anybody.
It simply stated in effect tha.t upon the retur:J?. to
the plaintiff of that sum the bill w-ould be disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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missed. The decree '"as anticipa tor~T in :every
essential. The case remained -subject to further
a.etion hy the c.ourt. Loonie Y. Wilson, 2~3 M~~ss.
· 420, ±~3, 1~4 N. E. 272; Cherry Y. Cherry·, 25:3
M·ass. 172, 176, 1-!8 N. E. 570."
1

In Nutt v. State (Miss.), 49 So. 1~5, an order. of the
court adjudged the defendant to.~b~· in conte~pt .and
ordered that if he did not ~comply with the c:o~rt's dire~
tion he would be sentenced at a future time. An appeal
was taken from this order and was dismissed Qecause
it lacked finality.

Eure v. Taylor, 126 Miss. 155; 88 So. 514, cites the
Nutt case and dismissed an appe:al from an order lack:ing finality be-cause the order gave .the defendant .ten
days to purge himself of a conte·mpt.,: and failin-g he was
to have been sentenced.
Counsel for defendants cite several cas-es including
the Cta.se of Bamkers Trust Company

v.

District ·court, 62
Utah 432, 220 Pac. 708, on the proposition that prohibition will not lie where appeal after judgment will constitute an adequate remedy, but such citations are based
upon the assumption that an appeat lies from the ord.er
in the ~case at bar. That assumption is erroneous, the
cited cases are not applicable.
The case of Snow v. Svn,ow, 13 Utah 15, 43 Pa,c. 620,
1s

c~ted

.by defendants as showing that appeal will lie

from a judgn1ent finding a person to he guilty· of .a civil

contempt.
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Unlike the instant case, the order appealed from in
the Snow -case was an order or-dering that a warrant of
arrest issue and that the appellant he committed t.o the
custody of the marshall until he purge himself of such
conten1pt. In thra.t. e:ase there was a definite commitment
of the appellant to the custody of the marshall. H·e was
sent to jail for his disobedience of the court's order.
II.
PROHIBITION IS PROPER REME'DY.

In the preceding pages it has been demonstrated
that the order in question was n\ot a final or appealable
order. Since certiorari is a correetive and not a preventive remedy and since it is not here sought to correct
any action .of the district court already taken, hut on
the contrary to prevent threatened future action, it is
apparent that petitioner has no adequate remedy in t~e
ordinary course of la.w· either by appeal or certior:ari,
and that he is without any remedy for the threatened
wrongful action of the district -court except by prohibitiron.
The errors of the district court complained of by
petitioner are such a.s to create an intolerable situation,
fraught with hardship and injustice. As shown by petitioner's application herein and his brief in support thereof, the tax commissi1on although ·not having any right or
.authority so to do, served upon petitioner a subpoena
requiring him to appear before it with his books and
records and give testimony 0oneerning the inheritance
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tax liability of the estate of his deceased mother.

.The
tax 0ommission had no right, power or authority to issue
such a subpoena. Such proposed exan1inatilon -vvas not
in any manner limited 'hy any issues nor in any man:ner
~canalized. It \Yas admittedly s-ought for the purpos-e of
aiding the examiner·s to prepare themselves to meet or
form issues that might or might not later arise. The
subpoena is an impertinence. It enmmanded a citizen
to show his private papers and records to a commission
possessing no power to enforce inspection except perhaps by ¥lay of depositi,on or subpoena duces tecum.
Unless the defendants are restrjained, petitioner
must yield to thes-e illegal and unlawful demands of the
tax commission or .submit himself to the defendants and
suffer the imposition -of a fine or jail sentence. No need
is there to labnr the point to demonstrate the hardship-s
impos.ed by the order ·complained of. There is a remedy
against being publicly judioially stigmatized. In the! instant case that remedy is prohibition.
In cases of irreparable harm or injury or hardship
courts relax the ge:neral rule 'vi th respeC't to when prohibition will or will not lie. Under this trend, appellate
courts in pr.ohi,bition proceedings do not look too closely
to see if the action o.f the defendant is mere error within
its jurisdiction or entirely beyo:nd its jurisdiction.
In the case .of Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.
(2nd) 377 ( 1936-), this court in an opiniion written by
Justice Wolfe ~squarely f~aced the propio,sition of whether
a writ o.f prohibition would lie in a ·case of error 'Vithin
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the jurisdicti·9n -of t]l.e court, and decided that prohibition
was a pro-per. remedy·) under such circumstan,ces. In that
case the ·C'Ourt. used this language, at page 387' of Pacific
Reporter:
'' rrhis i!Jpstrates the dilemma into which
courts ·have· been forced because there is no ade'qua te machinery provided .for reviewing interlOicutory or intermediate actions by lower courts
·w·hen such actions relate to those matters which
·cannot readily or never can he undone by an appeal f:rom a final judgment even though the court
h.a s jurisdiction.''
P·aTtly .at least this trend has its basis in the inadequacy of judicial machinery as shown by the following
excerpt found a.t· page 387 o:f Pacific Reporter:
'''We have suspected, and it is borne out by
the .cases, that, owing to the inadequacy of judicial machinery' the superio-r eourts have ofttinles,
where the lower court was about to make some
intermediate,,or jnterlocutory order vv-hich -vvould
seriously .affect a relationship, a status, a right
to hold office, or the right of lienholders, stOickholder,s, creditors, or others, or the rights in or
status of prop·erty, and where the status quo by
such ordet \Vould he chang-ed from that over -vvhich
it would he were the suit to proceed along the
· sin1pie lines of a trial of fact, issued the writ of
prohibition· for the purpose of st~opping the mischief which would otherwise be done even though
technically· the-re is no lack or no excess of jurisdiction in the lower 0ourt. Iri iss·uing the writ
in such a· ca'se, the courts have either taken pai!ls
not to be. too inquisitive a.s to whether there is ex·cess or lac.k of jurisdiction or they ·have s·imply
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.·: ~ ~: ~-:~~· tWistPd \Vhat is really only errot· ou the~ part of
-'the lower ·eou:rt- into lack or excess .of jurisdiction,
or perchance they haYe found a. situation in\ ~vhich
there was truly excess or lack of jurisdieti,6n. "· .
Injustice, hardship or damage is a strong £actor in
bringing about this trend toward relaxation -of the general rule, as s·hown hy the fol1owing excerpt found at
page 388 of Pacific Reporter:
~'It

is impossible to retC~:oncile all t_he~se decisions or to evolve any rules .·of guidance from the
eases_ whi1c:h ·can be accurately applied to any given
situation. What can be Baid-.is that ordinarily the
superior eourt will look only to see if the lo'\ver
court "\\7 as acting without or- in excess of jurisdiction, and, if s-o, whether there is stilt not some
adequate and speedy remedy,· but- that, in certain situations where it would work a palp.able
injustice or hardship or caus·e damage which could
not be che1cked or remedied in· an)r other -\vay, the
superior court "\Vill not go to-o refi:n.edly into the
question as to wha.t constitutes error n1erely or
lack or excess of jurisdiict:iO!J: before- issuing the
writ."

Olson v. Dis1trict Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 P. (2'nd)
S29, 11'2 A. L. R. 438 (1937), was an original proceeding
in certi·orari t.o review orders of the _district court, the
effect of which \Vas to suspend .any further proeeeding in
a case until plaintiff should submit to having his deposition taken.

The court held that while the -error was

an appropriate remedy.
'

.

C:o~l'cerning
'

the order of the
'

-

one within the jurisdiction of the -court, eerti·orari was
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district court in the Olson case this court said at page
444 of A. L. R. and pag·e 534 of Pacific Reporter:
"·That the order of the c.ourt giving defendant Evans ten days after the plaintiff should sub,. mit himself to the taking of his deposition on the
notice a'nd affidavit served and filed was erroneous fo11o,vs frtom what -vve have s:aid herein.
W.hether the court e~ceeded its jurisdiction in
rnaking such ·Order in a strictly technical and
philosophical sense might he debatable. It is ex. ceedingly difficult, if not impossible, in all cases
to find and deli'neate the precise dividing line between that kind of error upon which excess qf
jurisdi~ct~on may be predicated, and error where
that element is not involved.''
And after quoting from two Utah cases showing that
the issuance of the writ is in the court's discretion, this
court in the course of its opi~nion further said on the
saine pages as a~bove :
"It thus appears that even though an absolute lack ·Or excess of jurisdiction cannot be
shown, the w·ri t ean he and, in practice, is issued
in the sound discretion of the higher court.''
In his concurring opinion in the Olson ease, Justice
Moffat points out that the complained of action of the
courtbelow was error merely and als·o that the petitioner
for the writ h ad not exhausted his remedy rn the district
court .by applying to have va.c.ated the erroneous part of
the order complained of, thereby giving the trial court
oppoi'tunity to correct the error before filing his application for certiorari.
1
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Justice \Y. olfe in ·his c.oncurring opinion in the OlsoTI
case expressed doubt as to 'Yhether the order of the
oourt \Yas beyond or in excess of juri·sdi1etion. He also
refers to his o'Yn opinion in ·Atwood v. Cox, supra, and
referrrng to hin1self as the author of that opinion says
at page 447 of A. L. R. and pa:ge 5.37 of Pacific Rep·nrter:
"Fie also stated that at times it \Yas necessary for the revie"T eourt to arrest ruction by the
lower court \Y here only error in the exercise of
legal po~ver was involved vvhen the consequences
would be irremedial if the lower court were permitted to ~c;on'tinue in its course; and that in those
cases, because of the lack ·Of any writ by whieh
interlocutory orders could he brought up for review ex<cept under the guise of being beyond or
in excess of jurisdiction, the review .courts benignly stretched the conceptions of jurisdiction to include treatment of them with .consequent eonfusion and contradiiction in concep·tion and in
cases.''
Justice Wolfe summed up his views as to the cl'ass
of cases in which harm or injustice would result unless
certiorari or prohibition was held appliea:ble, and used
the following language at page 449 of A. L. R. and p1age
538 of Pacific Rep·orter:
''Several times I have intimated that there
is need for s~ome writ which will bring before this
court certain intermediary or interlocutory nrders
to be issued when sUJeh order would do irremedia~ble .harm or oause .an impasse as in this case even
though the making of the order was only error
and not .iurisdictional. U :ntil s·ome mechanism is
so pr'Ovided, I must continue to concu.r or decide
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lha:t certibravri and·· prohibition are proper
dies in. su,ch· cases, though .to my mind· the
·i:i_··.l~· :;'may fYlot: hav-e a1cted beyornd or in excess of
1t'
dict-ion.'' (Italics ours)~
· ·· - · ,
·
·. 1.<"·

re1necourt
juris.

. . ·,~nd thus in .fhe :Olson case, although the complained
of actio'n •of ~the. court below·· i'nvolved ·mere error within
the>c,~urt's jurisd~ct_ion, and a'Ithough the petitioner there
4'ad not exh;austed .his remedy in the district court by
m()tion to vacate the erroneous· order, certiorari \-Vas held
to be·· a· proper remedy. F'or stronger reasons prohi~bi
t~~9~(sh:ol11d be held tn lie in .the case at bar.

. In :Eva~s. ·v. E~io,n'S, :----- Utah ·~----, · 98 P. ·(2nd) 703

}'"';

'

~

,

•,_

I

•

'

•

'

(1940), the petitioners sought to make permanent a. temporary ·writ o.f prohibition restraining the defendant
judge from further 'enforcing or attempting to enforce
a'n order requiring:·· the petitioners to p~oduce certain
reeords before a·no±ary deput:ized to· take the. deposition
o.f. one of the pet:itioners. While the writ was discharged
because the order directing one of the petitioners to produce the minute :book of a corp·oration was valid so far
as ..appeared on its face, this court considered the ease
on, its merits and in the course of its opini·on reiterated
the rule la,id down in Atwood v. Cox and O:lson v. District. iJou,rt, supra, to the effect that rn e~rtain cases whe-re
h'ard-ship or injusti:ee otherwise would result it would
disregard techntcalities and 'would rel~ax the general rule
With. re$pect t~ wh.en prohi,bition will or "\\'il{.not lie. In
that connection the· court said a:t page 707: ,
'' *-. * .:; ·* · 'The question is, thererore, is the
error one which results in usurping jurisdiction,

~ ~:J'd fJ~i.>
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.or is it only e:rror \Yithin the, fr~unework of its

jurisdietion -~l l"'he first. is ~jurisdictional error,
Jhat is. that \\Thich takes UU\varrau ted jurisdiction; the secO'nd is error \vithin jurisdioti·on. The
.differenc-e bet\Yeen these t\YO kinds of error is
s·ometinles very difficult to disting-uish.· We tre.ated this at length in At\Yood Y. Cox, 88 Utah 437,
55 P. :2d 377. It is unnecessary furither to elaborate upon it. It \Yas als.o the~e· ~aid, that" ~here
-the erPor \Yas such as to prevent· any ade-quate
remedy by appeal b~caus-e by t·hat. time the har1n
already \V·ould ·be done, we would not look _ ..too
closelv to see if the threatened alct.ion of the court
would be mere -error -within' its jurisdic.ti;on·: 'or
jurisdictional error. We follpwed that .d9:ctrine
in Ols·on v. District C-ourt, 93 Utah 145, 71 P. 2d
529, 112 A. L. R. 438."
, ,.
r

••

•

As further evidence of the trend towavd relaxation
l

''

•

<

~*

C: '

I

·Of the strict general rule we cite the following ex•eerpt
from the -eoncurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in the caS>e
of Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 61 P.

(2~nd),

1'-262

(1936), \vhieh .appears at page 1:267 ·of P,aicific Rep:orter:

" .~~

*

* In the case· o.f At,vood' v. Cox,

supra, I stated that the action of the t-rial judge
in the McCrea. ·Case in regard to which a, .writ of
prohibition was sued oui was really' not one he~
y-ond his jurisdiction but error only; yet the· result of leaving the correction. of such error .to
appeal would be locking the stab1e. door aft.er . th.e
horse was stolen. Owing to the necessity 'of.· arresting the trial court presently . in· -order "that
grievous, irremedial injury would not result, this
court held prohibition was proper, ·which required
that it construe what was really error as being
juris.dicti~onal.''
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'Tn ., their brief counsel cite the case of Cro·wther v.
Distri-ct Court, 9·3 Utah 586, 54 Pac. (2d) 243, as one in
\Vhieh this e;ourt had before ~t much the. s·ame question as
is presented by the ease at bar. We rC.annot agree that
the· question there presented w.as even similar to that
presented in t!he ease at bar. In that ·case the defendant
court had issued a citation dire·cting petitioners to appear and show ·Cause why they should not he punished
for cont·empt for dis·ohedience to .a previous o~der of the
court requiring them to appear at a time and plaee specified in·order that their dep.ositio'ns mi,ght be taken. Pursuant to tlrat citation, the petitioners appeared and objected to the jurisdiction of the court and moved that
the citation he quashed. While that motion was under
advisement by the defendant court, the petitioners obtai'ned an alternative writ of prohifbition from this court
directed to the defendant court. Within the time fixed
in the alternative writ, the defendant eourt appeared
and moved that the petition for the writ and the order
contained in the alternative writ be dismissed for the
rea~so'n

th.at at the time the writ was served on the de-

feud-ant court it had determined to dismiss the contempt
proceedings then pending before it, and stated that if
the alternative writ issued by this court were to be
vaca~ted

pendi~ng

he would dismiss the contempt proceedings then
before him.

Under such circumstances there

was :nothing left f.or this court to do except to recall and
vrueate the .a1ternative writ and to deny the petition for
a~

perm'anent writ.
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Counsel also cite the ca.se o.f Boa.rd of Home ·Missio-ns v. Mau.ghn. 35 Utah 5}6, 101 Pac. 5-81 (1909')~. In
that case the petiti<mer sought to restrain the defenrdant
judge from continuing \Yith a hearing in which p·etitioner
as garnishee 'Yas being examined to as,cer,tain whether
one B;arrett had money due him fron1 the petitioner. The
petitioner claimed that the garnishment proeeedings were
instigated by B·arrett for the purpose of dis(eovering
what evidence would be presented by petitioner in a se~
para te action by p-etitioner against Barrett then pending
in .a·nother court. This court refused to gra.n t the writ
and said that the error of the lower -court, if any, was
not in excess of its jurisdiction even though an appeal
from the order .of the court would have been too late to
prevent the dis!Closure ·Of evidence. The fa,cts in that
ease are substantially different from the facts i•n the case
at bar. That case was de:cided in 1909, before the ex-ception to the general rule above referred to ha:d been
recognized by this court. To the extent that this case
i~ not in harmony with .AtwDod v. Cox, supra, Olson v.
District Court, supra, and E;vatns v·. Ev·a:ns, supra, 've
su'bmit that it is overruled by those cases.
The other cases ·cited by counsel on this point are
eases which uphold the general rule that prohibition is
an ex·traordinary legal remedy which is to be used sparingly, and that it will not lie '\vhere there is a. plain,

speedy and adequate remedy i•n the ordinary course of
larw. We have no quarrel with such rule.

Our position

is that the f·acts in the ins~tant case c:ause it to fial1 within
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the rule annou»·c.edin AtwDol} v. Cox, . Ol$on v ... District
Court and Evans :V. EvamiS,·supDa.
1
l

,1

';

,:..

I'

.

'

I'

··

'

-

Counsel al~o- cite Attorney: ()enera.Z v. Pomeroy, 93
Vt~;h :f2'6, 73 P .. (2~~d) 1277, 114 ·A. L. R. 72!6 (19·37), t10
sho~. :that the order adjudging the petitioner to be in
contemP't -could have been ap·pealed from without waiting for sentence
.. · That case does not so hold. Prohibi.
tion issues w.here there is not a. plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordimary course of law.
·~.

.,

'

.

..

.,

. ,.The P·omeroy 0ase involved an app~'al from an order
of nonsuit. kn intricate set of facts in that case differentiates. it fr·~~ the case at :bar. Beeause of the entry
of the order of rJ.Onsuit as to certain of the parties, the
Attorney General would lra ve been obliged (unless an
appeal frotn su~ch order had been allowed) to mark time
while the action
berng tried by the receiver a~~inst
the ~defendants, and then if on appeal the order of nonsuit ·had been reversed, the .Attorney General in proof
of his case would have been required to introduce in evidence against the d.ismissed defendants the same evidence
tha.t was introduced against them by the receiver. Because of that unu~ual si'tuation, the order in that case
wa:s regarded as an a ppeala:ble 'One. This. court in that
connection said at p~age 129.8 of Pacifi.c Reporter and
7;~1,· 7·52 of A. L. R. :
.

wa.s

'

.

'' * * * The rule (concerning what constitu, tes a .final judgment) is not so inflexible that we
cannot retain the appeal when we ca'n, by express.: - ing an -opinion on the matter app·e.aled from, save
a dou'b1e · trial. It is a discretion and ex·ception
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h~--"t-~~-

'

: .

t..

f·'': .

\

··rarely to he used, btit "·e think this is one of th'e
times ''"hen ''"e should ·m-ake an exception t'o ·the
general rule.
'.

"* · * · -* The economy of the situation re:-

·quires a rel.ax·a tion of tl1e r~le. Had. the p l'aih tiff
not brought this appeal he "vould · have :t:run,.· the
risk of this ·eourt taking a different .view,;in which
case his time for a.ppeal vYould have ru.n. . l-Ie., wa_s
bet,Yeen the devil and the deep' se·a. '' (P.arentheses
ours).
;'· ·
It vYill be noted th'at in that case this court sai•d:
'' 'Ve think this is one of the times wh'e:ri we should ·make
an exception to the general rule." .(Itaii~cs ours). ' TO
make an exception in one case ·certainly cann,ot ·
r:ega.rded as ''in the ordinary oourse of 'law.''

he

For the same purpose as the Pomeroy ease is Gi~e_d,
counsel also cite In re Thomas, 5·6 Utah 3-~5, ,190. ~·a·c.
952 (19'20); Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 61 PaY:~. (2d)
1262 (1936) ; North Point, etc. Comp(J{ny v. Utah. &; .S~ L.
C{JIYIJa.l C:o., 14 U ta1h 1;55, 46 P·ac. 824 (189·6) .
.

.

.

.

\

~-··

In In re Thomas, supra, the judgment of contempt
was a final one from which an appeal lay .as- sho·wn. by
the· following excerpt appearing on page 954 of Paci:fi1c
Reporter :
" r,.,_,:''After heari·ng the evidence., ·which- is very
voluminous, the court adjudged all three griilty
·of eon tempt, and entered judgxnent a1c:cordingly. ''
· There W'as nothing alternative or conditional about
that ·JUdgment. Therein lies the differ:ence between that
judgn1ent and the order in the- case at bar.
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·. --Shu;rtz v~ Thorley, supra, involved an appeal from
an order o:f dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as to one
of two· defendants. It was b;eld that the order of dismissal was ·not a final and appealable one.

In North Pomt, etc. Co. v. Utah d!i S. L. C·a.nal Co.,
·sup-ra, which was an action to restrain defendant from
dis:charging certain waters upon the lands of plaintiff,
the District o·ourt granted a·n injunction pendente lite.
D~efendant appealed from the order granting the injunction, and respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that it was not a final judgment. The appeal
was dismis·sed on the ground that the order was not a
final· or appealable one.

III.
TAX COMM·IS'SION WA:S WITHOUT AUTHORITY
TO I1S.SUE SUBPOENA IN QUEISTION .

.Qiounsel for defendants state that it is only by reason of the pr-ovisions of Se-Cttion 80-5-46 (16) that the
tax commission has the subp·oena power in connection
with any tax act and that it is by reason of that section
that 'the ta.x commission has taken the position that it
has ·the· ·subpoena power in the case at bar. ~Subsection
16, 80~·5-46 is a:s follows:
''To examine all records, hooks, pa.pers and
documents relating to the valuation of property
of any -corporation or individual, an'd to subpoena
witnesses to a1ppear and give testimony. (lfnd to
produce rgcord·s, books, p·apers a!Jil.d docu/Jnents reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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la:ting to O/ny m.a.tter tvhich the tiaX c:orrvmission.
shall ha·ve aulhority to itnv·estig:ate or .deterrnine.
The tax eommission or any party may in any inv-estigatibn cause depositions of witnesses to be
taken as in civil ,a;ctions. Any memiher of the
state tax com1nission, its secretary, cashier, and
such other officers or employees as the ~commis
sion may designate, may administer oaths and
affirmations in any matter or proc.eeding relating
to the exercise o.f the po1Yers and duties of the
tJax co1nmission. '' (Italics theirs).
Counsel argue that the language of this subsection
is clear and unambiguous and that it gives the subp~oena
power to the tax commission ''in relation. to affV!J 'YYW/Itter
which the tax commission shall home avu.thority to ivnr
vestigate or determine.''
This section gives the -commis.sion power "to examine all records, books, papers and ~locuments relating
to the valuation of property of any corp:orartion ·OT individual.'' The power to make such examination is given
with respect to the valuation of property of a;ny .corpora. .
tion -or individual. The valuation and a!ssessment of
property is the fundamental thing which the legislature
had in mind when conferring these p·owers. That view
is horne out by the fa1ct that Chapter 5, and all of its
64 sections, relate exclusiv-ely to the assessment and colleotion of taxes on real and personal prop-erty. ·It was

the valuation and assessment of real and peorsonal property which the legislature had in mind.

That was the

subject matter of the act. ·The next clause of

su'bs~e,c.tion

}6 reads: ''and to subpoena witnesses to appear and give
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tesiitnony and to produce reeords, bo-oks, papers and
documents relating to any matter which the tax eomrriis~
sioi1} ·.shall: have'· authority to investigate or determine:''
The· true n1eaning o.f the phraseology last quoted· will be
di selosed if' the ·words ''concerning ·such valuation ·of
property" are ±n~strrted after the words '·'any matter".
With that phr~a.se so interpolated the phraseology_ in
question would read: '·'and to subpoena witness-es to ap~
pear: and give testimony and to produce records, .books,
papers and documents relating to any matter concerning such valuation of pro'Perty which the tax commission
shall.have authority to investigate or deteTmine. ''
In other words, by the first clause of this subse-ction
the ta'x commission· is given the right to go to the taxpayer's place of busti·ness and ~xamine all records, books,
papers and documents relating to the valuation of his
property, hut if the ·commission doesn't choose to go to
his p~ace of bus~ness for such examination, it may if it
80 elects subpoena the taxpayer or any other witness to
appear and give testimony a·nd produce his re1cords,.
boo~s, papers and documents relating to such valuation.
The phrase ',, r·ela ting to any matter which the tax. co~m
mission sha~l have authority to investigate. or, determine'' has reference only to the as·sessment and valuation o.f real. and personal property.
_T;he legislature by this sulhsection did not intend to
confer· up·orn the tax commis·sion a·ny subpoena powers
conCHrning inheritance tax matters.

What the ·legisla-

ture did and what it int'ended to do wa·s to confer· upon
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th~ tax

<:onunission a po\Yer eo-extansiYP and -onl)·· eoextensive "·ith the principal or subs·tantive powers gr,a.nted to the eomn1ission by the a'ct of 19 31. Chapter 5, Title
80, sho\vs that that a.cf relates exclus,ively to .the as-sessment ood collection of taxes on real arnd personal property. In Yie\v of that fact this subpoena. povver is 1nerely
ancillary and in aid of the sn:bstantive powers granted· to
the ·Commission by the act.
1

This rule of construction IS laid down in 59 C. J.
980, in the following language :
"·Gener.al \vords in a statute should receive ·a
general construct1on; but they must be understood
as used with reference to the subje·ct matter in the
mind of the legislature, and strictly limite9. to_. it.
Their meaning may, if ·necess_ary, be expanded,
as may that of narrower words, oT their 'nie'iining
may be restricted, and they s:hould .be ·so limited
in their application as not to l~ad to injustice, op·pressi,on, or an ahsurd con-sequence. So words of
general import in a statute are limite·d by words
of restri1cted import immediately following·.: an~d
relating to the s.ame suibject. . * * * '', ·.
.See: State v. Hyde, 88 0Te. 1, 1'69 Pa.c. 757, Ann. Cas.
1918E 6B8 ( 1918) ; Uzzell v. Lunney, 46 .· Colo. 403, 104
Pac. 945 (1909'); U. 8. v. Osage Coun:ty, 19·3 Fed.' 485
(1911); Lewis v. Northern Facific Ry. Co., 36 Mont.' 207,
92 Pac. 469 (1907).
; :The povvers conferred on the tax commission by the
wet were powers relating exclusively;·>to· the assessment
of· taxes on real and personal property. The subp:oena
powers thereby granted to it were limited to inv,estiga-
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tiop.s ::~oncerning real and personal prop·er!ty Thes.e powers. !co~uld not l;)e,, eAtended to include investigations. conceili~ing excis.~, ,ta.:x;es . such as those .dealt with in , the
corporation Jran,·chise tax a·et and.the individual incom·e
tax act.
: A study ·of the··statutes will demonstrate that where
subpoena powers have been given they ha:ve been specifically given and ·n,ot given by implication. Defendants
take the position that subpoena powers are not spe-cifically grant~d in t,he follo:wing a~cts: sales tax, use tax,
mp~p:r vehicle registration, cigarette tax, ol·e-omargarine
tax,; motor fuels tax and inheritanc'e tax. They contend
tp~.t tlle general power under S·ection 80-5-46 (16) gives
th~. tax commission subpoena powers in all of these acts.
A.
r~a~ing of. the.:.acts will demonstrate that that con,
tention is n·o:t. in any degree tenable. Se-ction 9 of the
~al~,~:
a;ct provides that the taxpayer shall preserve
his books, etc. for a period of three years and that "the
same shall he open for examination at any time by the
tax commission * ' * *. '' (L·. 1'9·33, Chapter 63, Section
9, ·as· :.Amended by Chapter 103, L,. 19·39·) .
.'.··

-

'

'.

tax

.'· ':Section 20 of· the use tax aet has substantially the
s.ame provision (Chapter 114, Laws· of Utah 1937) ..
· :The m·otor vehiele registration a1ct spe-cifically :gives
th.e'>tax cbirrrci.ssion authority to summon witne·s~es. to

gr~e: :testimony and to require the production of rele~ant
1.
~
ho:oks; pap.ers ·and records. (L. 1935, Chapter 46, S.ection
j : ; I

J

; }

:fa).~,u

·. .

.·.

:

.

· ·. . .

·

.

.

.

. , ·

.
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The cigarette and oleomargarine tax a.et gives the
tax commission the po,ver to enter upon the premises
of the taxpayer and examine his books, papers, records,
ete. {93-1-14, R.. S. 1933, as amended by Chapter 7, Laws
of Utah 1933, S·ec.ond Special Ses.sion).
The motor fuels tax act gives the comnnss1on the
right to insp~ct the record of all purchases, reeeipts,
sales and distriibution of n1otor fuel of eruch distributor.
(Section 57-12-13, Chapter 67, Laws o.f Utah 19·39').
The po,ver of subpoena can be used only when directly and .speci:fi,c.ally given. This power should be used
sparingly. F'rom the limited powers given· in the above
acts it is plain that the legislature did not regard th·e
tax commission as having subpoena power except where
s·peci:fi.eally given. In the motor vehicle registration a-ct
the legislature wanted the commission to have subpoena
power and specifically gave it such power.
It must be borne _in mind tha.t there is no pending
litigation. Nothing is pending before the tax commission nor before the courts to d·etermine the inheritance
tax liabilitT of the estate of Nellie R. Mayers. There
may never be such a controversy. The tax commission
insists that it ha.s the right to subpoena wi tne-ss,es· and
require them to bring their books and records for unlimited examination and before any is·sues are fixed or
even contemplated. Wh·en proceedings are instituted the
tax commission ·needs no subpoena powers. It will then
have the power of .summons and deposition. In the ex-
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ercl'se of those rights the witness will he protected in
person and in property by the issues formulated and by
the fact that the person taking the deposition or the
clerk of court will be the custodian o.f the records.
Respeetfuly submitted,
BALL

AND

MussER,_

Attorney-s for
Petitioner and Relator.
0 f 0 O'Uh'ltS el
CoNWAY

A. AsHTON.
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